Braided in Fire

Racist 92nd Performance Report

The racist implications of the Second 92nd Performance Report are discussed in this expansion upon Long Note #174, along with other aspects of the failures of the 92nd Infantry Division.

Daniel Gibran offers insights in his book The 92nd Infantry Division and the Italian Campaign in World War II.

 A second 92nd Division performance report was put together on June 24–25, 1945 by a board of senior white officers presided over by General John Wood and sent to General Joseph McNarney, the Mediterranean Theater commander, together with a long cover letter by General Almond.

Daniel Gibran, who was the principal investigator and project manager of the Shaw team which, (in conjunction with the Army), established the worthiness of the African-American recipients of the 1997 Medals of Honor, writes in his book The 92nd Infantry Division and the Italian Campaign in World War II. Jefferson NC: McFarland & Co, 2001. pp 102–103:

[The second report] probably constitutes the only instance in American military history where all of the top commanders of a division placed blame for failure completely on their soldiers, rather than accepting responsibility themselves. Disparaging the capabilities and combat performance of black officers, the report, at the same time, lavished praise on the behavior and fine performance of the division’s white officers.

… The black officer was viewed as a ‘by-product of his race’ in whom ‘servility’ has been ‘bred… for generations.’ For this and other reasons, he could not become an aggressive troop leader. Moreover, the black officer’s ‘love of exhibitionism’ that stemmed from ‘an inherent inferiority complex’ prevented him from inspiring confidence in his men

       It is important to remember that by Army regulation no black could outrank a white in the same unit and therefore white officers were far more responsible for decisions made. In Sommocolonia it was not a black lieutenant ordering the retreat of an essential unit to meet the coming attack, it was the commanding white lieutenant colonel.

       Thirty years after the June 1945 report, Almond reiterated his viewpoint. Following are excerpts from ‘Reminiscences of a Soldier: An Oral History of Lieutenant General Edward Mallory Almond (1892–1979),’ based on conversations with his grandson, Captain Thomas Galloway Fergusson, USA, at Anniston, Alabama on 25–30 March 1975.

Cpt. Fergusson asked, “General Almond, if you had had to make a recommendation at that point, about the future use of Negro troops in the US Army, would you have recommended the continuation of segregated units, or would you have recommended integration of combat units in the future?”

Almond’s answer was, “I would have agreed to the integration of combat units to the extent of utilizing Negro personnel in areas that did not require exposure and decision of individuals and bravery in offensive operations. That means that the combat battalion and the squads that composed the companies of that battalion would be jeopardized by integrating Negro elements into units that had to operate in combat areas. The Negro is a useful individual; he is an American citizen, he should be employed in the defense of this nation, but to expect him to exercise characteristics that are abnormal to his race, is too much and not recommended by me.” (Filed with General Edward Almond’s Notes on “The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army,” 4 June 1959, Almond Papers, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.)

The following statement General Almond made to interviewer Lee Nichols in November 1953 further illuminates his racial point of view:

“The white man… is willing to die for patriotic reasons. The Negro is not. No white man wants to be accused of leaving the battle line. The Negro doesn’t care…People think that being from the South we don’t like Negroes. Not at all. But we understand his capabilities. And we don’t want to sit at the table with them.”

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Record Group 329, Office of the Chief of Military History. Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944. (Volume Two of The Liberation Trilogy.) New York: Henry Holt, 2007. p 383.

The 92nd Division clearly had some performance issues, (i.e. the failure to take Mount Cauala and the city of Massa). Gibran offers the most comprehensive picture why. He says:

“The apparent failure of elements of the all-black 92nd Division to consistently engage the enemy and fight with grit and determination is traceable to four major conditions… Segregation combined with apathy and distrust; Lack of motivation and low morale; Low levels of educational attainment; and Leadership.” (Some of these conditions were not applicable to the 366th Regiment which had, for example, high levels of educational attainment: see the end of this note.)

Gibran explores the first three unfavorable conditions and then concludes,

“Apart from his racist views and orientation, Almond’s questionable leadership ability and style were manifested in a number of other areas. He was aloof and austere, not in tune with his men. He consistently failed to recognize the extent of the morale problem the division was experiencing, and he showed very little interest in the welfare of the men he was leading. Moreover, his prior exposure to commanding black troops was negligible and his experiences as a commander were severely limited. As a tactician and strategist, he was poor and excessively egotistical. Many of the disasters that the division experienced in Italy were directly attributable to him. In this regard, his inflated ego would not allow him to take responsibilities for failure, but to place it directly on the men he was leading. Additionally, Almond’s failure to recognize acts of heroism by individual blacks was unconscionable and an abdication of responsible leadership. It is not an overstatement of fact to say that [Almond’s] leadership was mainly responsible for the division’s numerous failed attempts to engage the enemy and hold their ground in Italy.”  Gibran, The 92nd Infantry Division. pp 162–165.

A comparison with the 366th Infantry Regiment:
Regarding the low level of educational attainment Gibran speaks of: James Pratt wrote me on January 12, 2018: “A quick count by me for 1941 determines that at least seven 366th officers had master’s degrees, at least four were practicing lawyers, and at least two had PhD’s.  There were thirteen MD’s and dentists. Approximately 80% of the officers of the 366th had college degrees in August, 1941.”

I would imagine this to be a high level of education for any group of 126 men in that era.

Re the first 92nd Division performance report issued March 5, 1945, see Braided in Fire Chapter Thirty-five.

 Solace Wales